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Abstract: In the wake of the financial crisis considerable momentum has built-up behind 
proposals to extend central counterparty (CCP) clearing in the over-the-counter derivatives 
markets. However, the implementation of new rules is proving complex. This paper argues 
that one cause of this complexity is that the public sector is seeking to incorporate into 
legislation (and require the wider use of) a privately owned and operated risk management 
mechanism. As a matter of law, the paper argues that CCP clearing can be understood as a 
market-generated ‘legal device’; in other words, one designed to support the markets by means 
of the interaction of various private law techniques. Following this analysis through, the paper 
highlights the benefits and drawbacks which derive from the legal techniques underlying CCP 
clearing (standardisation of contracts, asset-backing, netting, and so on) and argues that these 
qualities are inherent to the device. It concludes that the inherent capacity of CCP clearing 
gives rise to a qualitatively different set of challenges for policymakers than those arising from 
technical implementation, and it explains that both types of problem need to be addressed if 
the CCP prescription is to be effective.  
 
 
                                                     
* Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. With thanks to Professors 
Niamh Moloney and Hugh Collins for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any errors are 
the author’s own. The final version of this paper is forthcoming; see J.P. Braithwaite, ‘The Inherent 
Limits of “Legal Devices”: Lessons for the Public Sector’s Central Counterparty Prescription for the 
OTC Derivatives Markets’ (forthcoming, March 2011) European Business Organisation Law Review. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditionally regarded as an important but unglamorous part of the infrastructure 
of the financial markets, commentators have often subjected central counterparty 
(CCP) clearing to metaphors about plumbing.1 CCP clearing services are operated 
by clearing houses such as LCH.Clearnet Ltd (LCH) or ICE Clear Europe, which 
are authorised and supervised in the UK by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA).2 The job of CCPs is to provide clearing services to members and 
exchanges, reducing risk and increasing efficiencies in the post-trade and pre-
settlement period. How they achieve these important effects as a matter of law is 
one of the questions which is central to this paper.    
As states and other regulators have considered their responses to the financial 
crisis, CCPs have come to assume a prominent place in the debate. Specifically, 
the recommendation that CCP clearing should be required for over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives,3 as a way of increasing transparency and stability in these 
markets, has been endorsed by the G20, the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank, the Obama administration, and HM Treasury and the FSA amongst 
others. On the basis of the shared features of these authorities’ recommendations, 
I label this reform the ‘CCP prescription’ for the OTC derivatives markets. 
However, as I discuss below, this is not to downplay the important differences in 
detail between what various parties are proposing. 
The providers of clearing services have responded swiftly to the opportunity 
presented by these recommendations, with some setting up clearing systems for 
OTC derivatives even before new rules had been published in draft form. As early 
as August 2009, at least seven clearing houses for CDS had already launched or 
were forthcoming: in the US (ICE US Trust, CME); the UK (NYSE 
LIFFE/BClear, LCH.Clearnet, and ICE Clear Europe); Germany (Eurex); and 
France (LCH.Clearnet S.A.).4  
However, concluding from all this momentum that the CCP prescription is 
one of the more uncontroversial or straightforward elements of the public sector’s 
legislative response to the financial crisis would be a mistake. In fact, settling the 
                                                     
1 For example, ‘Counter Insurgency: The Craze for Clearing Houses’ (27 June 2009) The Economist, 
(describing CCPs as ‘part of the financial plumbing’) at <http://www.economist.com/node/13905494> 
(all websites last visited 15 February 2011); ‘Making a Stink; Credit Derivatives’ (1 July 2006) The Economist 
at <http://www.economist.com/node/7126393>; N. Aubry, ‘Regulating the Plumbing of Europe’ 
(2008) 23 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 578; and P. Wood, ‘What Is a Central 
Counterparty in the Financial Markets?’ (Allen & Overy, 20 August 2009) noting the usual metaphors and 
expressing a preference for a comparison with cathedral columns, at <http://www.allenovery.com/ 
AOWEB/AreasOfExpertise/Editorial.aspx?contentTypeID=1&itemID=52783&prefLangID=410>. 
2 The regulatory framework for CCPs is discussed in B. Penn, ‘Recognised Investment Exchanges (RIEs) 
and Recognised Clearing Houses (RCHs)’ in M. Blair and G. Walker (eds), Financial Markets and Exchanges 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
3 See the definition of derivatives generally and of OTC derivatives in the text to note 8.  
4 European Central Bank/Eurosystem, ‘Credit Default Swaps and Counterparty Risk’ (August 2009) 77 at 
<www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/creditdefaultswapsandcounterpartyrisk2009en.pdf>.  
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detail of new legislation to mandate further CCP clearing of OTC derivatives has 
turned out to be an extremely difficult task, involving technical decisions on a host 
of matters. The public debates thus far have addressed a range of such matters 
simultaneously, including what types of derivatives the reforms should cover, what 
qualities are needed for a derivatives contract to be ‘clearing eligible’, whether 
clearing should be mandatory or recommended, how non-cleared (or non-
clearable) contracts should be regulated, where CCPs should be located, how 
many there should be, how they should be run, who should bail them out, and so 
on. Each of these details goes to the heart of how the CCP prescription will work 
and, if not confronted effectively, threatens to frustrate any new rules which 
policymakers produce.  
Against this background, this paper focuses on the nature and capacity of 
CCP clearing itself and the consequences for the debate about the public sector’s 
implementation of the CCP prescription. The emphasis in this paper is on the role 
of private law, which has featured less prominently in the debates than some other 
perspectives,5 but which offers valuable insights into the process of implementing 
this reform. The thesis which I advance in this paper is that:  
 
1) Implementing the CCP prescription is proving complex in part because 
the public sector is seeking to incorporate into legislation (and require the 
wider use of) a privately owned and operated risk management 
mechanism. However the implications of incorporating mandatory CCP 
clearing into financial regulatory reform have not been addressed in a 
systematic way in the public debates, which have tended to ask ‘how will 
this reform work?’ rather than first dealing with the question of ‘how does 
CCP clearing work?’.  
 
2) CCP clearing is complex and can be analysed in different ways depending 
on the disciplinary perspective being used, but as a matter of law it can be 
understood as a market-generated ‘legal device’; in other words, it is a 
process designed to serve the markets by means of the interaction of 
various private law techniques. Following this analysis through highlights 
not only the strengths but also the limitations arising from the underlying 
legal techniques (standardisation of contracts, asset-backing, netting and 
so on).  
 
3) These strengths and limitations are inherent to the device. This means that 
they have to be recognised and managed upfront by policymakers 
                                                     
5 For example, as compared to the disciplines of finance and economics which were well-represented at 
the ‘high-level conference’ organised by the European Commission on 25 September 2009 to conclude its 
public consultation on OTC derivatives markets. The agenda and materials from this conference are at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/derivatives/index_en.htm>. There has, of 
course, been input to the CCP debate from practising lawyers. See, for example, A. Glass, ‘The 
Regulatory Drive towards Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC Credit Derivatives and the Necessary 
Limits on This’ (2009) 4(S1) Capital Markets Law Journal S79.  
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intending to incorporate CCP clearing of OTC derivatives into their 
regulatory response to the financial crisis.  
 
4) The inherent capacity of CCP clearing represents a qualitatively different 
set of challenges for policymakers compared to those arising from the 
implementation of the CCP prescription; however, both types of problem 
need to be addressed if the CCP prescription is to be effective.  
 
In advancing these arguments, this paper is organised into three parts. The first 
provides the background to the CCP prescription, charting the problems which 
have been diagnosed in certain OTC derivatives markets in the wake of the 
financial crisis, the emergence of the official consensus behind an extension of 
CCP clearing, and the ongoing attempts to settle the detail of this reform.  
The following part of the paper considers the function and capacity of CCP 
clearing. Contextualising CCP clearing alongside other ‘legal devices’ which 
facilitate market activity, I argue that the strengths and weaknesses of such devices 
are usefully highlighted by taking a private law perspective. I go on to consider, as 
a matter of English law, the legal techniques underlying CCP clearing as a way of 
investigating the capacity of this particular legal device.  
The next part of the paper returns to the ongoing policy debates about the 
CCP prescription. On the basis of the preceding analysis, I suggest that it is 
helpful to isolate two different types of challenges confronting policymakers. The 
paper concludes with thoughts about how the debates about the CCP prescription 
may usefully proceed.    
 
 
 
THE CCP PRESCRIPTION 
 
The financial crisis which began in 2007 with, as Lord Turner has put it, ‘an initial 
crack in confidence and collapse of liquidity’6 brought the international banking 
system to the brink of collapse and continues to have devastating effects on the 
real economy. Since then, a significant part of the debate about ‘what went 
wrong’7 and what should happen now has focused on the OTC derivatives 
markets.  
Derivatives are bilateral contracts in which the parties’ rights and obligations 
are calculated with reference to a specified index, asset, interest rate, commodity or 
                                                     
6 A. Turner, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (London: FSA, March 
2009), 27. George Soros states that ‘the outbreak of the current financial crisis can be officially fixed at 
August 2007’. The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2008), xiii. 
7 The title of chapter 1 in Turner, ibid.  
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other metric.8 OTC derivatives are usually defined as those which are entered into 
privately rather than on an organised exchange. This is a useful definition, though 
in practice the distinction is not always this clear cut.9 The most important types of 
OTC derivatives are interest rate, credit, foreign exchange, equity, and 
commodities derivatives. As discussed below, new and proposed legislation 
mandating CCP clearing seeks to catch all types of OTC derivatives (exceptions in 
the legislation published so far turn on the identity of the contracting party, not 
the nature of the derivative in question). However, the momentum for this reform 
originated in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, when the debate focused on 
credit default swaps (CDS), a type of credit derivative.  
Legally speaking, a CDS is a contract where the rights and obligations of the 
parties derive from the credit risk of a reference entity or asset. Under a CDS, a 
‘protection buyer’10 contracts with a counterparty and in return for a premium 
buys protection against particular credit events (which should be carefully defined 
in the contract).11 CDS emerged as a class of OTC product in the mid-1990s, and 
since then, the growth of the market has been staggering.12 However, by the 
outbreak of the crisis in 2007 various factors had made this market particularly 
fragile. The Turner Review, for instance, drew attention to the ‘sheer size and 
complexity of the market and the fact that it is traded in an almost entirely Over-
the-counter (OTC) fashion’.13  
The extraordinary complexity which evolved in this part of the OTC 
derivatives market has now been widely documented.14 In particular, the use of 
CDS not in ‘single-name’ products,15 but as a ‘building block’16 in complex 
securitisations which create new instruments with ‘synthetic’ exposure to a 
portfolio of assets,17 has become a hot topic for economists and other 
commentators considering the build-up to the financial crisis. For example, the 
                                                     
8 For a more detailed definition of derivatives see J. Benjamin, Financial Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 65. 
9 As demonstrated in E. Murray, ‘UK Financial Derivatives Commodities Markets’ in Blair and Walker 
(eds), n 2 above, 273-274. 
10 To use the term which is central to Benjamin’s thesis of financial law. Benjamin, n 8 above, 49-50.   
11 The obligations of the protection buyer and seller under a single name CDS are helpfully set out in 
diagrammatic form in D. Rule, ‘The Credit Derivatives Market: Its Development and Possible 
Implications for Financial Stability’ (June 2001) Financial Stability Review (London: The Bank of England), 
118. See also the detailed explanation in ‘What Are CDSs and How Are They Used?’ in European Central 
Bank/Eurosystem, n 4 above, 9-10. 
12 For example, the European Central Bank/Eurosystem note that the CDS market rose by 900 per cent 
in the three years prior to the end of 2007 by which point it had a gross nominal value of US$58 trillion. 
European Central Bank/Eurosystem, ‘OTC Derivatives and Post-Trading Infrastructures’ (September 
2009), 13 at <http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/overthecounterderivatives200909en.pdf>.  
13 Turner, n 6 above, 82.   
14 For example, see the 2009 European Central Bank/Eurosystem report which called CDS ‘opaque 
credit risk instruments’. n 4 above, 4. The European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, 
Charlie McCreevy, has commented of CDS that ‘the opaqueness of these products leads to nasty 
surprises when things go wrong’. ‘Time for Regulators to Get a Better View of Derivatives: Statement on 
Reviewing Derivatives Markets before the End of the Year’ (Speech/08/538, Brussels, 17 October 2008). 
15 Where CDS provide protection with respect to individual reference entities or assets. See Rule, n 11 
above, 118-119. 
16 ibid, 140. 
17 ibid, 120-121. 
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proliferation of complex securitised products attracted detailed analysis in the 
Turner Review,18 and in 2009 the US Department of the Treasury stated that the 
risk characteristics of CDS used in asset-backed securitisations proved to be 
‘poorly understood even by the most sophisticated of market participants’.19 
Elsewhere, one (lay) author has suggested that no one understood these complex 
structured products at the time,20 and even the most expert financial services 
commentators have resorted to magic-referencing metaphors in their attempts to 
convey the complexity involved. Howard Davies, for instance, talks of the 
‘complex alchemy’ of securitisations,21 while Charles Morris (whose software 
company made tools for ‘building and analysing […] securitised asset pools’)22  
writes of how ‘highly rated bonds magically materialize out of a witches’ soup of 
very smoky stuff’.23 
CDS ultimately played a decisive role in the near-collapse of the American 
Insurance Group (AIG) which had to be bailed out by the US Government in 
2008.24 This rescue was in part driven by the large net selling position the insurer 
had in the CDS market, as a counterparty to CDS of over US$400 billion.25 Thus, 
had AIG collapsed in such a ‘highly concentrated’26 market, it would have left very 
many ‘protection buyers’ without the benefit of their CDS contracts. As the 
European Central Bank/Eurosystem review put it, these counterparties would 
have ‘instantly been forced to reappraise the value of the underlying corporate 
debt obligations […] It was widely considered that the expected knock-on effects 
for the already destabilised financial system would have been far-reaching.’27  
The collapse of Lehman Brothers (another major participant in the CDS 
market) also served to draw regulatory attention to the systemic risk posed by this 
deeply ‘interconnected’ market,28 and together these crises jump-started the debate 
                                                     
18 For example, see the discussion of the ‘wave of financial innovation focused on the origination, 
packaging, trading and distribution of securitised credit instruments’ and the subsequent discussion of 
complex products in Turner, n 6 above, 14 and 22, 28.   
19 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Financial Regulatory Reform. A New Foundation: Rebuilding 
Financial Supervision and Regulation’ (undated) 47 at <http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ 
Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf >.  
20 The playwright David Hare concluded in a recent work that ‘[n]obody understood them. Even Alan 
Greenspan […] he didn’t understand them […] He said he had hundreds of people with PhDs working 
for him and they didn’t understand them either’. The Power of Yes: A Dramatist Seeks to Understand the 
Financial Crisis (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), 34.  
21 H. Davies, ‘With the Benefit of Hindsight: Lessons from the Credit Crisis for Banks, Regulators and 
Central Banks’ (Speech given in Singapore, 10 November 2008), 3 at <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/ 
aboutLSE/meetTheDirector/speechesAndLectures/home.aspx>. 
22 C. Morris, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers and the Great Credit Crash (London: 
PublicAffairs Ltd, 2008), xvi. 
23 ibid, 79. 
24 European Central Bank/Eurosystem, n 4 above, 30. See also the account of the aftermath of AIG’s 
downgrading in Glass, n 5 above, S88.  
25 European Central Bank/Eurosystem, ibid, 29. 
26 ibid, 4.  
27 European Central Bank/Eurosystem, n 12 above, fn 17, as well as European Central 
Bank/Eurosystem, n 4 above, 28 (describing AIG as ‘too interconnected and too big to fail’).  
28 European Central Bank/Eurosystem, n 4 above, 4-5. 
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about extending CCP clearing as a way of increasing transparency and stability. As 
Glass put it, ‘the current financial crisis has been a game-changer for the prospect 
of CCP clearing of credit derivatives’.29 
  
WORLDWIDE PROPOSALS TO EXTEND CCP CLEARING 
 
As the causes of the financial crisis were being studied by regulators around the 
world, a consensus quickly formed behind the proposal to extend CCP clearing to 
the CDS markets. Significantly, the leaders of the G20 made a commitment to this 
reform relatively early on. The document produced at their London Summit of 
April 2009 stated that ‘We will promote the standardisation and resilience of credit 
derivatives markets, in particular through the establishment of central clearing 
counterparties subject to effective regulation and supervision.’30 The G20 then 
followed up in September 2009 with a more detailed agreement. Notably, this 
document extended the types of OTC derivatives which were being targeted, 
stating that: 
  
All standardized (sic) OTC derivatives contracts should be traded on 
exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared 
through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivatives 
contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared 
contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.31 
 
This September 2009 G20 proposal to require CCP clearing of all standardised 
products across the OTC derivatives markets has subsequently framed the 
international debate. The discussion below considers the position in the UK, the 
EU and the USA, but consultation about introducing similar regulation is also 
currently underway in other G20 markets such as China.32   
In the UK, the FSA and HM Treasury have stated that that they ‘strongly 
support’ the extension of CCP clearing in the OTC derivatives markets.33 
However, amongst other reservations, a joint December 2009 report expressed 
concern about the G20’s proposal that ‘[a]ll standardized derivatives contracts’ be 
cleared, arguing that there is more to being ‘clearing eligible’ than a contract simply 
                                                     
29 Glass, n 5 above, S81. 
30 G20, ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System’ (London, 2 April 2009) under the heading 
‘The Scope of Regulation’ at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html>. 
31 G20, ‘Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit’ (Pittsburgh, 24-25 September 2009), [13] at 
<http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm>. 
32 The Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission plans to ‘consult the market on the regulatory 
regime [for the OTC derivatives markets] by the third quarter of 2011’ on the basis that this is ‘an 
important move for Hong Kong to keep pace with international initiatives on this front’. Regulatory Regime 
for the OTC Derivatives Markets (Press release, 10 December 2010) at <http://www.sfc.hk/ 
sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=10PR145>. 
33 FSA and HM Treasury, Reforming OTC Derivative Markets: A UK Perspective (December 2009), 11 at 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/reform_otc_derivatives.pdf>. 
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being made on standardised terms.34 In particular, this report drew attention to the 
need for there to be sufficient market liquidity to support clearing services.  
The Bank of England has also expressed its support for the CCP prescription, 
though in tightly drafted terms which referred to the ‘expansion of the use of 
central counterparties for the clearing of vanilla over-the-counter (OTC) 
instruments’.35 On the basis of recent Financial Stability Reports, the Bank is 
particularly concerned about the risk management practices of CCPs themselves.36 
Indeed, the Bank’s December 2010 Report raised concerns about global standards 
for CCP risk management, ownership structures, and CCPs’ collateral buffers.37 It 
even went so far as to suggest that CCPs that are ‘not-for-profit [and] user-owned’ 
may be in a position to manage risk more effectively than those run on a ‘for-
profit’ model, and that ‘governance reform of CCPs might be needed over time 
given their increasing systemic importance’.38   
At the EU level, extending CCP clearing for all classes of OTC derivatives 
has been embraced with enthusiasm. Extensive consultations recently culminated 
in a proposal for a Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties, and 
trade repositories.39 This proposed Regulation mandates CCP clearing for ‘all 
OTC derivatives which are considered eligible’ and which are entered into 
between financial counterparties or between a non-financial counterparty and a 
financial counterparty in certain circumstances.40 The proposed Regulation also 
lays down detailed new rules for the regulation of CCPs themselves,41 and it 
requires all market participants to provide specified information about their OTC 
derivatives dealings to trade repositories or a competent authority.42  
                                                     
34 ibid.  
35 Included in a list of areas where the ‘Bank believes change is needed’ in Bank of England, Financial 
Stability Report (June 2009), 36 at <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2009/fsr25.htm>. 
36 ibid, 54. 
37 Bank of England, Financial Stability Report (December 2010), 57 at <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
publications/news/2010/147.htm>.  
38 ibid, 57. This proposal has caused a certain amount of controversy, for example as discussed in N. 
Cohen and J. Grant, ‘Clearers’ Ownership Model Under Scrutiny’ (22 December 2010) Financial Times.  
39 Proposal for a Regulation on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories 
COM(2010) 484/5; 2010/0250 (COD) (Proposed Derivatives Regulation). 
40 ibid, Title II, art 3(1). Clearing will be required for contracts between a financial and non-financial 
counterparty unless the latter’s transactions relate to its commercial activities or fall below a certain 
threshold, which is to be defined separately. Title II, arts 7(2) and (4).  
41 ibid, Titles III and IV. These proposed provisions should also be read alongside a more recent 
European Commission consultation paper which discusses the possible introduction of rules imposing a 
positive capital change for banks’ exposures to CCPs. The paper proposes these charges should be lower 
if the CCP in question is a ‘qualifying’ CCP. A qualifying CCP is defined as one which has complied with 
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)’s Recommendations for CCPs, as well as 
meeting other criteria. As the consultation paper states, ‘the main reason behind this differentiation is the 
desire to provide incentives to use “qualifying” CCPs, which are deemed to be safer’. European 
Commission, ‘Consultation Document: Counterparty Credit Risk’ (9 February 2011), 5 at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm>.  
42 Proposed Derivatives Regulation, n 39 above, Title II, art 6(1) and Title II, art 7(1) (non-financial 
counterparties only have to report positions above a threshold, which will be fixed separately).  
  
Joanne P. Braithwaite           Private Law and the Public Sector’s Central Counterparty Prescription 
 
 9
However, the proposed Regulation leaves open some fundamentally 
important operational issues. For instance, rather than set out on the face of the 
Regulation which contracts are to be affected, the new European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) is to be responsible for compiling the list of ‘classes of 
derivatives’43 which are ‘eligible for the clearing obligation’, and a mechanism is 
provided for how the ESMA is to add new classes to this list.44  
While the stated goal is that new EU rules should be ‘in place and operational’ 
by the end of 2012,45 sweeping financial reform regulation has already been passed 
in the US in the form of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010.46 Amongst its many provisions, the Act provides for 
compulsory CCP clearing in the OTC derivatives markets. Title VII (‘Wall Street 
Transparency and Accountability’, hereafter ‘Title VII’) is the main source of new 
rules for the OTC derivatives markets, though there are several provisions 
elsewhere in the Act that will also have a significant impact on participants in these 
markets.47  
A detailed review of the provisions of the Title VII is outside the scope of 
this paper. However, some of the main provisions as regards the OTC derivatives 
market are as follows: it will be unlawful to engage in a swap unless it is submitted 
for clearing if it ‘is required to be cleared’; 48 all swaps, regardless of whether they 
are to be cleared or not, will be subject to reporting requirements;49 and parties 
which are ‘Swap Dealers’, ‘Major Swap Participants’, or ‘Major Security-Swap 
Participants’ entering into non-cleared swaps will have to meet capital 
requirements and post initial and variation margin.50  
                                                     
43 This term is defined as derivatives that ‘share common, essential characteristics’. In a complex and 
innovative market, it is submitted that this may not prove to be a very practical definition. ibid, Title I, art 
2(4).  
44 ibid, Title II, art 4.  
45 European Commission, ‘Commission Proposal on OTC Derivatives and Market Infrastructures –
Frequently Asked Questions’ (MEMO/10/410, 15 September 2010).  
46 H.R. 4173, signed into law by President Obama on 21 July 2010 (The Dodd-Frank Act). The scope of 
the Act is captured by its long title: ‘An Act to promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, the end “too big to fail”, to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and 
for other purposes’.  
47 For example, the new limits on banks’ proprietary activities in the Dodd-Frank Act, Title VI 
(‘Improvements to Regulation of Bank and Saving Association Holding Companies and Depository 
Institutions’).  
48 As regards swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 723(a), inserting Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2), s 
2(h)(1)(A). As regards security-based swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 763, inserting Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq), s 3C(a)(1). (The Dodd-Frank Act, Title VII provides separately for two types 
of swaps: ‘swaps’ and ‘security-based swaps’.  
Swaps are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and security-based 
swaps are the responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The definition of both 
terms is addressed within the Act. These definitions will not be explored further in this paper as the two 
sets of provisions in the Act largely mirror each other. However, for the sake of completeness, references 
to the Act are provided for both categories of swaps). 
49 As regards swaps, Dodd-Frank Act, s 727, inserting Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2(a)), s 
2(a)(13). As regards security-based swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 763, inserting Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m), s 13(m).  
50 The meaning of which is explained in the text to note 97. As regards swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 731, 
inserting Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), s 4s(e)(2)(A) and (B). As regards security-based 
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This Act is, in the words of one law firm, ‘massive’.51 Title VII alone 
represents a major overhaul of US financial regulation, and when combined with 
provisions elsewhere in the Act, it will dramatically change the regulatory 
landscape of the OTC derivatives markets. However, as with much of the rest of 
the Act, definitions of fundamentally important terms, key details about how the 
provisions will actually work in practice, and secondary rules which are needed to 
flesh out the new regulatory framework have been reserved for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CTFC) and other regulators. For that reason, the debate about how the CCP 
prescription should work in practice still has a long way to go, even in the US.  
The story of the CCP prescription so far can therefore be characterised as 
one which started with high-level principles expressed by authorities keen to 
respond promptly to the weaknesses that the financial crisis revealed in the CDS 
market. Since then, it is possible to track the emergence of a broad, international 
consensus behind the increased use of CCP clearing across the OTC derivatives 
markets. However, as the debate has worn on, the sheer complexity of 
implementing new rules has caught up with legislators, triggering divergence and 
even disagreement on a number of technical issues that promise to be critical to 
the effectiveness of reform. As a result, fundamental details about how this reform 
will work in practice still remain open and, even with the Dodd-Frank Act now 
signed into law in the US, it remains true to say that no jurisdiction has yet set 
down clear rules on fundamental issues such as which products will and will not 
have to be cleared.  
There are clearly multiple drivers behind this complexity, including the fact 
that the debates are proceeding across different national and transnational 
jurisdictions simultaneously. But while the challenges of international coordination 
have been widely acknowledged,52 there has been a less coherent approach within 
                                                                                                                                       
swaps: Dodd-Frank Act, s 764, inserting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), s 
15F(e)(2)(A) and (B).  
51 DLA Piper, ‘Dodd-Frank Alert: Regulators Take Centre Stage’ (2010) 1 at <http:// 
www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/dodd-frank-act.pdf>.   
52 In particular, as regards the importance of a coordinated approach to standard-setting for CCPs. 
International coordination is being facilitated in this respect by the work of the CPSS and IOSCO, which 
are currently engaged in an ongoing review (at the G20’s request) of their recommendations for CCPs.  
The European Commission has also recently emphasised the need for global coordination in terms 
of these reforms, referencing the awaited review by CPSS and IOSCO and citing the OTC Derivatives 
Regulators’ Forum which ‘was established to promote cooperation between regulators’. n 45 above. The 
House of Lords European Union Committee (HL EU Committee) has welcomed what it sees as the 
Commission’s ‘acknowledgement of the need to develop a coordinated global approach in line with the 
work of CPSS and IOSCO’. House of Lords European Union Committee, The Future Regulation of 
Derivatives Markets; Is the EU on the Right Track? Report with Evidence, HL Paper 93 (10th Report of Session 
2009-2010, 31 March 2010), 42 (HL EU Committee Report).  
US legislation also acknowledges the need for international coordination. For example, the Dodd-
Frank Act, s 722 addresses the extraterritorial application of the legislation while s 719(c) requires the 
CFTC and SEC within 18 months of the Act to jointly conduct a study into swap regulation, clearing 
house and clearing agency regulation in the US, Asia, and Europe identifying ‘areas of regulation that 
could be harmonized’.  
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the debates to an equally important source of complexity. This is the fact that the 
CCP prescription incorporates into legislation CCP clearing, a privately owned and 
operated risk management device that is a product of various private law 
techniques.  
Of course, certain aspects of the private nature of CCPs have had an impact 
upon the public debates about the CCP prescription. Expert witnesses from 
clearing house companies, trade associations, end-users, and dealers gave detailed 
evidence to the House of Lords European Union Committee (HL EU Committee) 
about how their businesses work, making a considerable impact on the 
Committee’s final report.53 The European Commission’s consultations sought the 
views of hundreds of parties from the private as well as public sectors.54 
Nonetheless, I argue below that the public debates would benefit from addressing 
the private nature of CCPs upfront and in a more coherent way, rather than 
dealing with the implications as part of a long list of other issues. To put it another 
way, the debates described in this part of the paper have tended to centre on the 
question of how this particular reform should work in practice, at the expense of 
considering in detail the legal nature of the CCP device that the public sector is 
seeking to incorporate into legislation. As discussed in the next part of the paper, 
the nature of CCP clearing can be usefully explored as a matter of private law, and 
the benefit of this approach is that it helps to systematise the various problems 
thrown up in the public debates about this reform thus far.  
 
 
 
A PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVE 
 
As Waddams notes, ‘Anglo-American law has claimed many merits, but linguistic 
and conceptual precision are not among them’.55 However, in the financial 
markets literature, ‘private law’ typically refers to the legal norms used by private 
actors to ‘create or alter private rights’56 as between themselves. This can be 
distinguished from the legal norms imposed on them ‘from outside’ by public 
actors such as legislators. Though the distinction between private and public 
actors may be a particularly artificial one in the context of what Black has 
described as the highly ‘decentred’ and ‘hybrid’ context of financial regulation,57 it 
is possible to be more precise when addressing a particular sector of the markets. 
For example, in Partnoy’s critique of the role of ‘private law’ within the 
                                                     
53 See HL EU Committee Report, ibid, 46, Appendix 2 (List of Witnesses).  
54 As explained in European Commission, ‘Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Regulation 
on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories’ (COM(2010) 484/5, 
2010/0250(COD)), 3-4.  
55 S. Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.  
56 Black’s description of one of the function of legal norms. J. Black, ‘Mapping the Contours of 
Contemporary Financial Services Regulation’ (2002) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 253, 256. 
57 Black explores the ‘hybridity’ of decentred financial regulation by focusing on the ‘extremely wide 
range of actors who are or potentially could be involved in the regulatory process’. ibid, 262. 
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fragmented regulation of the derivatives market he discusses the use of the 
standard form contracts created by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA)58 and the effects on derivative counterparties’ rights of the 
disclaimers therein.59   
Studies of private law in the financial markets are often preoccupied with the 
nature of the contracts, or even individual contractual terms, which market 
participants enter into with one another; hence the large literature about standard 
form contracts or boilerplate drafting in the sovereign debt,60 syndicated loan,61 
and OTC derivatives markets.62 Valuable studies have highlighted how market 
actors use sophisticated standardised contracts and other drafting techniques to 
mitigate credit risk when they are relatively unprotected by public sector rules,63 to 
send a signal to public authorities and other non-parties,64 and otherwise to 
facilitate international transactions.65  
But there is more to private law in the financial markets than the skilful use of 
contracts, and in practice parties often pursue their goals by deploying a number 
of legal techniques (such as asset-backing and netting) in combination with one 
another. For example, collateralisation in the OTC markets, as studied by Riles in 
her anthropological work on Japanese derivatives dealers, turns on the interaction 
of standardised contracts with the transfer of rights in property which together 
enable the parties to bypass national bankruptcy laws on the insolvency of a 
derivatives counterparty.66 Other examples of the deployment of interacting 
private law techniques are found in the use of special purpose vehicles in 
securitisation transactions (involving asset-backing, limited liability companies and 
trust structures),67 close-out netting as used in master agreements (standardised 
contracts, novation)68 and, most importantly for these purposes, central 
                                                     
58 ISDA is the trade association for participants in the privately negotiated derivatives markets. See 
<http://www.isda.org/>. F. Partnoy, ‘The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation’ (2001) 
22 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 421, 479. 
59 ibid, 478-481.  
60 For example, A. Gelpern and M. Gulati, ‘Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study’ (2006) 84 
Washington University Law Review 1627; C. Bradley, ‘Private International Law-Making for the Financial 
Markets’ (2005) 29 Fordham International Law Journal 127, 160-164; and the first case study in S. Choi and 
G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Contract as Statute’ (2005-2006) 104 Michigan Law Review 1129, 1133-1139.  
61 For example, Bradley, ibid, 166-170; Benjamin, n 8 above, 157-170.  
62 For example, Partnoy, n 58 above; Murray, n 9 above; A. Riles, ‘The Anti-Network: Private Global 
Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 605; J. Golden, ‘The Future of Financial Regulation: The Role of the Courts’ in I. MacNeil and J. 
O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2010), discussing the 
implications of post-crisis litigation for markets which use standardised contracts, making particular 
reference to the ISDA documentation; and Choi and Gulati, n 60 above, 1139-1144.  
63 Benjamin, n 8 above, 233-240 and 256-257.  
64 Gelpern and Gulati, n 60 above, 1712-1714.  
65 Riles, n 62 above. 
66 ibid 610-612.  
67 As discussed in D. McBarnet, ‘Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity 
and the Banking Crisis’ in MacNeil and O’Brien (eds), n 62 above, 70-72.  
68 Murray, n 9 above, 291-293. See also the discussion of close-out netting in the context of the repo 
markets in Benjamin, n 8 above, 320-321.   
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counterparty clearing. I collectively refer to these market-generated products of 
various private law techniques as ‘legal devices’.  
Though these legal devices are diverse, certain themes cut across the class. 
For example, the extent to which they are supported by legislation is striking. This 
support may be provide in one or both of two ways: through facilitative legislation 
(for example, as seen in the EU Financial Collateral Directive (FCD)’s provisions 
facilitating the posting of collateral by way of a title transfer collateral arrangement 
or security)69; and by legislation which disapplies ‘unhelpful’ rules (for example, 
the FCD’s disapplication of certain registration and insolvency rules for 
transactions within its ambit,70 and the US Bankruptcy Code’s ‘safe harbor’ 
provisions protecting certain types of derivatives contracts from the operation of 
bankruptcy law).71   
A second theme present within this class of legal devices relates to their 
capacity, understood for these purposes as a function of the underlying legal 
techniques. On this basis, the legal techniques underpinning these devices merit 
detailed attention in their own right because they determine a device’s inherent 
features, including their benefits, limitations, and weak spots. This insight is 
especially useful when, as in the case of CCP clearing, a device is to be 
incorporated into financial regulation by the public sector with the intention that it 
perform various, critical regulatory functions.  
The operation of CCP clearing can therefore be understood as depending on 
the interaction of a number of different legal techniques, which in turn define its 
capacity. The most important of these are considered below, along with the 
implications for the ongoing debate about CCP prescription. The specific focus in 
the following discussion is on English law, though of course the worldwide 
reforms discussed in the preceding part of the paper above will implicate CCPs in 
many different countries. However, it is submitted that the analytical approach 
developed here is applicable to CCPs generally, regardless of governing law.  
 
NOVATION AND STANDARDISATION 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental legal point about CCP clearing is that the contracts 
in question are between the CCP and the members of the clearing system rather 
than between members themselves. This arrangement lies at the heart of the 
operation of CCP clearing, and it is reflected in the European Central Bank’s 
definition of a ‘central counterparty’ as ‘an entity that interposes itself, in one or 
                                                     
69 Such provisions include Financial Collateral Directive 2002/47/EC, art 5, which protects the collateral 
taker’s exercise of a right of use over the collateral it receives from the collateral giver.  
70 Financial Collateral Directive 2002/47/EC, arts 3 and 8 respectively. 
71 11 U.S.C. § 560. These safe harbour provisions protect a non-defaulting swap counterparty’s 
contractual rights to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate one or more swap agreements because of the 
insolvency of the counterparty and ‘offset or net out’ sums so due. In a recent case related to the Lehman 
Brothers administration, safe harbor provisions were (unsuccessfully) raised in an attempt to save certain 
contractual provisions from the operation of bankruptcy law. Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services Ltd, Proceeding no. 09-01242 (Bankr. SDNY January 25 2010), 21-22.  
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more markets, between the counterparties to the contracts traded, becoming the 
buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby guaranteeing the 
performance of open contracts.’72 
Depending on the structure of the clearing system in question, this outcome 
may be achieved either by members A and B contracting in the first instance with 
the CCP, or by A and B contracting with each other initially, after which their 
contract is replaced by new ones between each member and the CCP.73 This latter 
arrangement depends on the legal technique of novation, which cancels one 
contract and replaces it with another. Novation is notable as the only means in 
English law whereby the benefits and burdens of a contract may effectively be 
transferred to a third party.74 Its capacity to bring about this ‘clean break’ allows 
the bilateral contract between A and B to be replaced by parallel contracts between 
A and the CCP and B and the CCP, with no rights and obligations (and therefore 
no counterparty risk) remaining between the original parties.  
That the CCP becomes the ‘buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer’ 
underpins some of the most important benefits of the CCP prescription. As 
discussed further below, it means that the CCP can act as a shock absorber on the 
insolvency of a market participant. It also means that the CCP will be in a position 
to collect critical information about the market. As explained above, the opacity of 
the CDS market to date has become a particular cause of concern for regulators. 
As the FSA and HM Treasury have stated in this context: ‘More generally, 
imperfect market information also limits a regulator’s ability to monitor systemic 
risks and act to mitigate them, and weak trade transparency for OTC contracts can 
negatively affect price efficiency.’75 In order to capitalise on this information-
gathering function, the Dodd-Frank Act expressly provides for CCPs (as well as 
trade repositories and other market participants) to be required to furnish 
information to regulators to help them detect and deter market abuses.76  
To facilitate a CCP acting as buyer to every seller and vice versa (whether 
through novation or otherwise) the contracts being cleared would normally be in a 
standardised form. In terms of the underlying legal techniques, this can be 
understood as contractual standardisation coming together with novation to 
facilitate the process of clearing. 
                                                     
72 European Central Bank/Eurosystem, ‘Glossary of Terms Related to Payment, Clearing and Settlement 
Systems’ (December 2009), 4. 
73 See the detailed discussion of how these alternatives work in different clearing systems provided by 
LCH in M. Yates, ‘UK Settlement’ in Blair and Walker (eds), n 2 above, 321-324. 
74 For a discussion of the different ways in which the transfer of assets may be effected under English 
law, including by means of novation, see Benjamin, n 8 above, 528-531.  
75 FSA and HM Treasury, n 33 above, 6. 
76 For example, as provided for in the Dodd-Frank Act, s 725(c) inserting Commodity Exchange Act (7 
U.S.C. 7a-1(c)), s 5b(c)(2)(K) and (L), which addresses the recordkeeping and disclosure obligations of 
clearing houses. This section provides that certain information is to be made public and disclosed to the 
CFTC, including the terms and conditions of each contract cleared, margin-setting methodology, and 
daily settlement prices and volume.  
  
Joanne P. Braithwaite           Private Law and the Public Sector’s Central Counterparty Prescription 
 
 15
The debate about the CCP prescription in the OTC derivatives market has 
tended to proceed on the basis of three assumptions about contractual 
standardisation: that greater standardisation is a good thing; that only standardised 
OTC derivatives products can be cleared; and that all standardised products 
should be forced into a clearing system. However, a closer look at what is involved 
in CCP clearing and at the legal technique of contractual standardisation shows 
that qualifications should be made to each of these assumptions.  
First, the assumption that greater contractual standardisation in the OTC 
markets is a good thing: Across the debates since the crisis broke, there has been 
widespread approval of increasing the use of standardised OTC derivatives 
documentation. As the FSA and HM Treasury have noted approvingly, ISDA is 
currently leading industry efforts to increase standardisation in particular OTC 
derivatives markets including CDS.77 Robert Pickel, the CEO of ISDA has 
observed that the ‘natural evolution of successful derivative products is in the 
direction of greater standardisation’,78 and (writing before the crisis) Walker also 
described standardisation in the OTC markets as a ‘useful device’.79  
However, the implications of the wider use of standardised contracts deserve 
to be discussed more thoroughly as part of the debate about extending CCP 
clearing. As a practical point, the law firm Ashurst LLP raises the point that the 
meaning of ‘standardised’ will be uncertain in practice, which may result in 
participants seeking legal opinions that their particular ‘contractual arrangement’ 
qualifies and should therefore be cleared by a CCP, potentially passing on 
‘unmanageable risk’.80 This raises the possibility of regulatory arbitrage by parties 
trying to get their contract cleared (rather than seeking to circumvent clearing 
requirements, which is the usual worry in these debates). Moreover, if the public 
sector mandates or otherwise works to increase the use of standardised 
documentation, this will have a knock-on effect on the regulatory role played by 
the trade associations or other actors responsible for producing it. Indeed, some 
academics have already expressed concern about the processes behind standard 
form documentation in the financial markets. For example, looking from the 
perspective of transparency and the processes of law-making, Bradley has 
expressed concern that standard form contracts ‘can constrain or limit regulation’ 
and that the ‘processes which produce [them] are private and opaque to 
outsiders’.81  
The contract law literature also helps to shed light on the use and properties 
of standardised contracts in the financial markets,82 and it provides a useful insight 
                                                     
77 FSA and HM Treasury, n 33 above, 9.  
78 R. Pickel, ‘Navigating the Financial Crisis: Choosing the Right Path for the Derivatives Industry’ (2009) 
4(S1) Capital Markets Law Journal S72. 
79 G. Walker, ‘Financial Markets and Exchanges’ in Blair and Walker (eds), n 2 above, 61. 
80 Memorandum by Ashurst LLP providing evidence to the HL EU Committee, in the HL EU 
Committee Report, n 52 above, 55. 
81 Bradley, n 60 above, 174.  
82 See also the work of Riles, who explores in some detail how standard contracts are used in practice, for 
example, contrasting the socio-legal view that they represent ‘the production of new legal regimes 
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into the potential implications of increasing standardisation in this case. In 
particular, Collins has shown how contractual standardisation is a powerful tool 
which allows autonomous ‘club markets’ to transform ‘contracts into things’83 (or 
‘objects of property’)84, thereby making possible a trade in futures contracts. 
However, he also shows how this use of standardised contracts necessarily 
excludes the ‘unusually reflexive’ qualities of contract law ‘as a regulatory 
mechanism’.85 This means, for example, that parties may not negotiate to resolve 
disputes on their own terms. In other words, market participants necessarily 
sacrifice a wealth of rights afforded by the private law system in return for the 
benefits of participating in autonomous, organised markets.86 In the context of the 
OTC derivatives markets, some of those rights (for example, which allow parties 
to hedge specific risks, tailoring their contracts by reference to the nature and 
dates of exposure they are facing) may well be very important for certain 
participants. There has been some discussion relating to these issues in the debate 
about the CCP prescription so far; for example, it has been argued that the CCP 
prescription represents ‘further specific restrictions on derivative transactions’ and 
impacts upon parties’ freedom of contract.87 However, the principal focus to date 
has been those parties who will continue to require bespoke products (as 
discussed, for example, by HM Treasury in its evidence to the HL EU 
Committee)88 rather than the constraints that standardised contracts impose on 
parties using them . 
The second assumption commonly made in the debate about the CCP 
prescription is that only standardised contracts can be cleared. For example, the 
European Central Bank/Eurosystem has stated that ‘to be eligible for clearing a 
product must, as a minimum, be liquid, have price transparency and be 
standardised’.89 However, evidence put to the HL EU Committee by LCH made it 
clear that certain non-standardised contracts could be accepted for clearing by a 
clearing house, as is the case with its portfolio of swaps.90 Thus, standardisation is 
not an essential prerequisite for CCP clearing. Using standardisation as a 
                                                                                                                                       
through the routinization of work and professional roles’ with the law and economics perspective that 
they represent ‘costs savings’. Riles, n 62 above, 624.   
83 H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 209-222.  
84 H. Collins, ‘Regulating Contract Law’ in C. Parker, et al (eds), Regulating Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 25. 
85 ibid, 24, discussing Collins, n 83 above, 65-69.  
86 ibid, 26. 
87 Ashurst LLP, n 80 above, 52. 
88 ‘Non-financial firms, in particular, have a legitimate need to transfer their risks using bespoke 
products’. Supplementary letter from HM Treasury, HL EU Committee Report, n 52 above, 17. For 
example, airlines use derivatives to address the risk associated with fluctuating aviation fuel prices. See the 
Memorandum by British Airways, providing evidence to the HL EU Committee, at HL EU Committee 
Report, n 52 above, 68-71.  
89 European Central Bank/Eurosystem, n 4 above, 79. 
90 Transcript, Examination of Witnesses R. Liddell (Chief Executive, LCH) and R. Cunningham (Director 
of Public Affairs, LCH), HL EU Committee Report, n 52 above, 46-47, Q126. (In evidence, Mr Liddell 
stated that it is ‘easier’ to clear contracts if they are standardised, but non-standardised contracts could be 
accepted for clearing, too. He gave as an example LCH’s swap portfolio, which he described as ‘simple 
and vanilla in its risk but not standardised in terms of transactions’.)  
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shorthand to describe which contracts can or should be cleared is therefore an 
oversimplification; rather, standardisation is better understood as one of several 
factors affecting the decision of private clearing houses about the sorts of risks 
they are willing and able to manage.91  
The third common assumption is that the CCP prescription should involve 
forcing all standardised products onto clearing. This goes back to the G20’s 
statement that ‘[a]ll standardized OTC derivatives’ should be cleared, which has 
been endorsed by the European Commission. However, considering this 
proposition from the point of view of CCP clearing systems shows that if this 
proposal were taken literally, it could have an adverse effect on the stability and 
risk management of clearing houses. As the report of the HL EU Committee put 
it, ‘CCPs are privately owned companies, which can currently refuse to clear 
products where they feel they cannot manage the associated risk and this system 
has worked well even during the financial crisis.’92 Being able to select which 
products to clear goes to the heart of the risk management practised by CCPs, and 
this might mean that some standardised contracts are not in fact clearable. If 
legislation were to force CCPs to clear, for example, illiquid but standardised 
products, this could adversely affect their ability to manage their own risk. In 
short, CCP clearing systems could become more vulnerable if their own decisions 
about which contracts to clear were overridden by public sector rules. Weakening 
the resilience of CCPs would, of course, be disastrous and ultimately risk defeating 
the whole object of this legislative exercise. 
Thus, the legal technique of standardisation is central to the debate about the 
CCP prescription because of how CCP clearing works as a matter of law. 
However, certain assumptions by policymakers have oversimplified the 
relationship between clearing eligibility and standardisation. An overly blunt 
legislative definition of those products which must be cleared could threaten the 
autonomy of CCPs to choose what to accept for clearing. While it will be a 
significant weakening of the original goal to clear all standardised contracts, the 
legislative definition of the products that must be cleared must provide (as US 
legislation does) for the CCPs to retain control of which products they clear. 
Overall, a more nuanced approach to ‘clearing eligibility’ than has been shown by 
some authorities to date is going to be necessary for CCPs to work safely and 
effectively within a new legislative framework.  
                                                     
91 LCH has stated that ‘the fundamental requirement for eligibility is that the CCP can manage the default 
of a participant through the implementation of both its risk management and default management 
policies in a way that controls systemic risk’. It explained that there are four main considerations for the 
clearing house in this regard, which can be summarised as: the assurance of market liquidity; availability 
and reliability of market prices; CCP default management procedures; and cost of providing clearing 
service and maintaining risk management structures. Memorandum by LCH providing evidence to the 
HL EU Committee, at HL EU Committee Report, n 52 above, 41. 
The Future and Options Association (FOA) gave the following as examples of factors affecting 
clearing eligibility: ‘pricing transparency, liquidity, volatility, risk complexity, valuation capability and the 
risk management capacity of the CCP’. Memorandum by the FOA, providing evidence to the HL EU 
Committee, at HL EU Committee Report, n 52 above, 90. 
92 HL EU Committee Report, n 52 above, 31-32.  
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FINANCIAL COLLATERAL AND ASSET-BACKING 
 
Benjamin describes the provision of financial collateral as ‘the use of financial 
assets in security, quasi-security or title transfer collateral arrangements’.93 In turn, 
she collectively describes these legal techniques as asset-backing, whereby ‘the 
credit exposure of the position taker is addressed by earmarking particular assets 
to meet its claims’.94 Asset-backing is an important feature of CCP clearing as 
members are required to post financial collateral as margin to cover their 
exposures to the CCP. As discussed above, the novation of members’ contracts to 
the CCP means that if one member were to default, the CCP would still owe the 
corresponding obligations to other members. Thus, this collateral is a vital first 
(but not only)95 line of defence for the CCP in the case of the failure of a market 
participant. LCH, for example, reported to the HL EU Committee that it held 
‘initial margin’ (explained below) totalling £50 billion. Moreover, it reported that 
its holding of $2 billion (sic) of initial margin in respect of Lehman Brothers easily 
absorbed the outstanding obligations owed to counterparties on the bank’s default 
in 2008.96  
Looking at the legal nature of members’ asset-backing obligations more 
precisely, members are required to post collateral as transactions are registered 
(initial margin) and then from time to time as provided for by the clearing house 
rules (variation margin).97 Yates notes that under the LCH Rules, initial margin 
may be provided in the form of various assets identified in LCH’s General 
Regulations, but variation margin must be provided in the form of cash.98 The 
significance of posting collateral in cash is not only, as Benjamin notes, that it is 
the most sought after form of financial collateral and therefore highly in demand,99 
but also that upon its transfer to the collateral taker (the CCP), the collateral 
provider becomes a creditor of the CCP.100 Moreover, the CCP’s enforcement of 
rights against the cash collateral will be by way of set off, as between the credit 
balance of the member’s account (the debt the CCP owes to the member) and the 
member’s liabilities (its debt to the CCP).101  
                                                     
93 Benjamin, n 8 above, 445. 
94 ibid, 331.  
95 Other resources which could be deployed in the event of a member’s insolvency include the CCP’s 
default fund and the capital resources of the CCP itself, as discussed in HL EU Committee Report, n 52 
above, 29. 
96 ibid. 
97 For a further discussion of ‘initial margin’ and ‘variation margins’, see P. Wood, English and International 
Set-Off (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1989), 171 (noting that variation margins may be calculated daily or 
with greater frequency).  The Turner Review found that the obligation in AIG’s derivative contracts to 
post variation collateral as its credit worthiness fell contributed to the group’s ‘downward spiral’ in 
September 2008. Turner, n 6 above, 22.  
98 Yates, n 73 above, 325. 
99 Benjamin, n 8 above, 450. 
100 Yates, n 73 above, 325. The implications of this point in the context of global custody are discussed in 
J. Benjamin and M. Yates, The Law of Global Custody (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002), 25.  
101 Yates, n 73 above, 325. 
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In contrast, when members post collateral in the form of non-cash assets, the 
member may retain property rights in the collateral. In the LCH context, for 
example, Yates describes how members provide collateral in the form of non-cash 
assets (eg, securities) by transferring the assets to an account with LCH and 
granting LCH a security interest, ie LCH takes a first fixed charge to secure the 
member’s performance of its obligations.102 This arrangement means that the 
member retains property rights in the asset which are, by definition, enforceable 
against third parties and survive the collateral-taker’s insolvency.103 There is a clear 
contrast between the position of the member in this case and the position if it has 
provided cash collateral, where the member would merely have personal rights as 
an unsecured creditor of the CCP.  
The legal effects flowing from the use of various types of financial collateral 
and asset-backing techniques may not, traditionally, have been at the forefront of 
market participants’ minds. However, the insolvency of Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (LBIE), an important prime broker holding the assets of 
many hundreds of counterparties,104 has recently brought home the enormous 
implications of such legal details, albeit in a different context within the markets. 
In the immediate aftermath of LBIE’s collapse, certain funds whose securities 
were held by LBIE applied for a court order which would have required the 
LBIE’s administrators to provide them with information about the whereabouts 
of their assets. The applicants argued that the lack of information and delay in the 
return of their securities (while administrators tried to untangle the complex 
arrangements used by LBIE and other members of the Lehman Brothers group to 
hold and use client assets) was having a highly damaging effect on their business. 
However, the court ultimately rejected the application on the basis that the funds 
were not entitled to special treatment outside the normal workings of the 
administration process.105 The extension of CCPs to vast new areas of the market 
will therefore mean that the complex legal details which can arise in relation to 
asset-backing and the holding of one party’s collateral by another will become 
even more significant within the financial system.  
                                                     
102 ibid.  
103 See the detailed discussion of the law of property in the context of the financial markets in Benjamin, 
n 8 above, ch 16.   
The distinction between a prime broker’s legal interest in clients’ securities and cash was the 
backdrop to a recent case about the legal status of securities which had ‘leaked’ into cash immediately 
before the prime broker’s insolvency. See In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe (in 
administration), Anthony Victor Lomas and ors v RAB Market Cycles (Master Fund Limited) and anr [2009] 
EWHC 2545 (Ch).  
104 As noted in a 2009 Court of Appeal decision, the administrators of Lehman Brothers International 
Europe wrote to 1,707 account holders who were ‘thought to have potential claims against LBIE for the 
return of trust property’. In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2009] 
EWCA (Civ) 1161 at [8]. 
105 In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2008] EWHC 2869 (Ch). This 
judgment cites the (anonymised) applicants’ evidence that ‘if the present situation continues for very 
much longer the funds are virtually certain to lose the confidence of their investors so that they will suffer 
revenue impairment […] In summary, the funds will suffer economic loss, and so will their investors 
unless their positions are transferred soon.’ at [13]. 
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Moreover, the asset-backing requirements of CCPs may have an adverse 
economic effect on ‘thinly capitalised’ market participants, and private finance 
initiative (PFI) and public-private partnership (PPP) project companies are cited in 
this context by the FSA and HM Treasury.106 So, on top of the legal risks which 
collateralisation represents, the extended use of CCP clearing will also mean more 
pressure on good quality financial collateral and the possibility of some parties 
having to borrow to meet these requirements. 
 
NETTING: NON-INSOLVENCY 
 
CCP clearing allows members’ positions to be netted in the ordinary course of 
events, ie when no members are insolvent. One benefit of this is that gross sums 
due between parties are replaced by a single net sum (owed to or by the CCP). 
This reduces parties’ exposures and takes the pressure off the settlement 
infrastructure. The importance of this latter, operational point should not be 
underestimated. As Wood notes, in the late 1960s and early 1970s ‘several major 
United States brokerage firms failed primarily because of their inability to process 
transactions. If buys and sells and corresponding payments can be netted, millions 
can be reduced to thousands.’107   
It is the case that, outside insolvency, parties could achieve similar effects 
without the use of a CCP through careful contractual drafting. For example, 
parties may provide for multilateral netting, where all of the rights and obligations 
between multiple parties are replaced by a single sum owed to or by each party. 
Wood describes this as the ‘non-mutual set-off of claims’, noting that the objective 
is ‘to minimise the number of actual transfers and circuity of contracts’.108 This 
contractual multilateral netting may be supported by a clearing house, though in 
this case its function would simply be to calculate the single sums owed to or by 
each party at the end of the payment cycle. In British Eagle International Airlines Ltd 
v Compagnie Nationale Air France,109 this sort of contractual multilateral netting was 
deployed by member airlines which owed money to and were owed money by 
each other because, for operational convenience, they sold tickets for services to 
be provided by other airlines. Facilitated by a clearing house, the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), the arrangements brought considerable operational 
advantages: in one year, only nine per cent of gross sums owing between the 
members actually fell to be paid.110  
If netting may be effected by the terms of the contracts between parties, why 
is CCP clearing useful? In addition to the operational advantages mentioned 
already, the main reason is that multilateral netting arrangements provided for in 
                                                     
106 FSA and HM Treasury, n 33 above, 13-14. 
107 Wood, n 97 above, 170. 
108 ibid, 185. 
109 [1975] 2 All ER 390. 
110 ibid, 404, per Lord Cross. 
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contracts will not survive the insolvency of one of the participants, as was 
famously held in British Eagle. In other words, as Wood says of such contract-
based multilateral netting arrangements ‘there is no objection to this as long as all 
parties are solvent’.111 Novating to the CCP overcomes this problem.  
 
NETTING: INSOLVENCY OF A CCP MEMBER 
 
One of the principal attractions of the CCP clearing is the capacity of the device to 
minimise market disruption on the insolvency of a market participant. For 
instance, evidence given to the HL EU Committee described how, on the 
administration of Lehman Brothers, the clearing house LCH was able to ‘liquidate 
the portfolio and settle outstanding obligations to counterparties […] [allowing] 
Lehman Brothers to default without significant adverse effects on its 
counterparties’.112 
But how, as a matter of law, does a CCP provide this effect? The House of 
Lords in the British Eagle case made clear that the CCP’s capacity to handle the 
insolvency of a member turns on the process of novation; it also showed what 
happens to multilateral clearing arrangements on the insolvency of a member in 
the absence of a CCP. 
In British Eagle, contractual provisions effected multilateral netting of rights 
and obligations between member airlines. However, when one member went into 
liquidation, the contractual provisions for multilateral netting were held to be 
ineffective in the face of the contrary provisions of the insolvency rules, which 
required bilateral netting.113 As Lord Cross explained in the leading speech on 
behalf of the majority, ‘[s]uch a “contracting out” must, to my mind, be contrary 
to public policy’.114 Thus, in the absence of novation to a CCP, the liquidators of 
the bankrupt airline were left able to pursue the debtors of the airline for sums 
owing to it, while its creditors had separately to prove their claims.  
In the more recent High Court of Australia case of Ansett,115 the majority 
found the amended version of the IATA clearing scheme to be effective, 
notwithstanding the administration of a participant. Significantly, the drafting of 
the new scheme did not in fact effect novation. However, IATA submitted and 
the majority agreed that: 
  
                                                     
111 Wood, n 97 above, 186. 
112 HL EU Committee Report, n 52 above, 29. 
113 At the time, Companies Act 1948, s 302.  
114 British Eagle, n 109 above, 411 per Lord Cross. 
115 International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd [2008] HCA 3 (6 February 2008).  
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[...] under the Clearing House arrangements no liability to effect payment 
arises between airlines and that the only debt or credit which arises is that 
between IATA and the member airline in relation to the final, single balance 
of all items entered for the relevant clearance. This is the consequence of the 
bargain struck by airlines such as Ansett when they became parties to the 
relevant multilateral agreements. That construction of the Clearing House 
arrangements should be accepted.116 
 
This case has important implications for the drafting of clearing house rules, 
though it is submitted that it does not disrupt the central point that novation to a 
CCP remains the safest and most conventional way of achieving the shock 
absorber effect on a member’s insolvency. It is also worth noting that Ansett has 
attracted academic criticism for being ‘generous to the architects of the scheme 
and somewhat unconvincing in its conclusions’.117  
In practice then, novation to the CCP means that upon settlement each 
member of the clearing system owes a net sum of money to or is owed a net sum 
by the CCP. The members will have to post collateral accordingly. On the default 
of a member, other members’ obligations to pay and be paid stand. The collateral 
taken by the CCP can be used to meet the CCP’s losses because of the default, 
though, as ISDA explained in evidence to the HL EU Committee, in the first 
instance the CCP may look to other clearing members to assume the contracts 
which the defaulting member had on its books.118 Thus, through a combination of 
novation, netting, and collateralisation CCP clearing protects the markets from 
disruption on the default of a participant.  
However, as Benjamin points out, ‘financial law cannot reduce risk, but only 
moves it from person to person’.119 In the context of CCPs, this reminds us that 
while members are protected from direct exposure to counterparty insolvency risk, 
this risk is assumed by the CCP itself. Therefore the CCP prescription depends, as 
the Turner Review put it, on ‘robust and resilient central clearing house 
arrangements for CDS clearing’.120 This explains why it is so important that any 
rules about which contracts are to be cleared do not undermine risk management 
by clearing houses (as noted above). It also explains why the debate about the 
regulation and supervision of CCPs, already an important ongoing issue at an 
international level, has become intertwined with that surrounding the CCP 
prescription. 121    
                                                     
116 ibid at [60] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, and Kiefel JJ. Later the majority reiterated that 
‘no liability to effect payment arises between airlines’. ibid at [94]. 
117 M. Bridge, ‘Clearing Houses and Insolvency’ (September 2008) 2 Law and Financial Markets Review 418, 
420. 
118 Supplementary Memorandum by ISDA, HL EU Committee Report, n 52 above, 36. 
119 Benjamin, n 8 above, 266. 
120 Turner, n 6 above, 82. 
121 As the FSA and HM Treasury note in their recent joint publication about CCPs in the OTC 
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MEMBERS’ CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
 
The final private law component of CCP clearing discussed here is the contractual 
relationship between the clearing house and the users of its services. This is 
sometimes overlooked in discussions of CCP clearing and has not received much 
attention in the debate about the CCP prescription so far. However, it is important 
in practice as it means that the CCP prescription has the potential to introduce 
another layer of complexity into the markets.  
Parties contracting with a CCP in the manner described must be members of 
the clearing house. The relationship between the CCP and its members is 
governed by a membership agreement.122 Crucially, in light of the CCP’s 
assumption of the insolvency risk of participants, there are criteria which parties 
have to meet before they are accepted as members of the clearing system. In 
LCH’s case, it requires (amongst other criteria) that members have ‘minimum 
levels of net capital’, ‘staff ‘of sufficient knowledge and expertise of the products 
being cleared’, and ‘appropriate systems to cope with their clearing activities’.123 
Yates observes that parties may either be individual clearing members (able to 
clear their own trades only) or general clearing members (able to clear their own 
trades and also those of customers who are not members themselves).124 
However, members contract with the CCP as principals, even when they are 
entering into transactions for a client.125 Needless to say, the law may become 
quite complex in this area, for example as to whether the non-member is bound 
by rules and customs of the market (here the clearing service) of which he is 
ignorant.126 Yates explains that in the case of LCH, where a member is acting as 
the agent for a non-member using the clearing services, the member must clear the 
contract through another general clearing member because otherwise it would be 
in the position of providing a service to its customer as agent and principal.127 
General clearing members are also required to maintain separate accounts with 
LCH in respect of house (its own) transactions and client transactions. This 
separation is extremely important for purposes such as collateralisation.  
There has been some concern expressed about how these arrangements will 
work in the context of the CCP prescription. For example, a recent European 
Central Bank/Eurosystem report flagged up what it called the ‘non-trivial legal 
issues that will need to be addressed’ before arrangements allowing non-dealers 
trading with clearing members to enjoy the benefits of CCP clearing will become 
                                                                                                                                       
CCPs’ thereby heightening the importance of rules imposed on CCPs about their ‘capital, risk 
management, margining and operational standards’. FSA and HM Treasury, n 33 above, 14.  
122 Typical obligations therein are discussed in Yates, n 73 above, 320.   
123 See the list of the ‘minimum acceptance criteria’ for membership of LCH, set out on the 
LCH.Clearnet Group’s website at <http://www.lchclearnet.com/membership/ltd/default.asp> also 
discussing the costs of membership.  
124 Yates, n 73 above, 318. 
125 ibid; R. Goode, Commercial Law (London: Penguin, 3rd ed, 2004), 158. 
126 See Goode, ibid, 159, citing Robinson v Mollett (1875) LR 7 HL 802. 
127 Yates, n 73 above, 318. 
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widespread.128 The FSA and HM Treasury have also expressed concern that legal 
arrangements allowing non-members access to clearing are sufficiently robust, and 
regulators are apparently monitoring progress in this respect.129 
The framers of legislation mandating CCP clearing therefore need to fully 
consider the problems arising from the capacity of different sorts of market 
participants to access clearing services. Not all parties which currently enter 
contracts caught by new legislation will be willing or able to meet the criteria to be 
clearing members themselves, and the corporate end-users of derivatives hedging 
business risk again come to mind. Moreover, to the extent that such parties rely on 
members of the clearing service, there is potential for considerable legal 
complexity to result from the nature of arrangements which they make. This 
would be an unwelcome by-product of reform. On this basis it would seem 
sensible either to streamline the means of accessing clearing services for non-
financial entities entering relatively low values of deals for the purposes of 
commercial hedging (perhaps by means of a publicly owned clearing house for 
non-financial entities only, with lower entry criteria and a maximum limit on 
participations) or, as the proposed EU Regulation does in some circumstances, to 
exempt these users entirely from mandatory clearing requirements.  
To sum up, this analysis shows how the legal techniques underpinning CCP 
clearing help to define the capacity of this device. As shown, CCP clearing means 
that settlement volumes are reduced, netting is facilitated, counterparty risk is 
removed, and the markets are insulated should a participant fail. However, the 
underlying legal techniques mean that there are limitations built into CCP clearing, 
too. Most importantly perhaps, because of how novation works, risk will 
concentrate in the CCP itself, its own robustness thereby becoming an issue of 
systemic importance as more and more products are cleared. As a private entity, 
the clearing house’s own management of risk remains crucial, including judging for 
itself which types of product can be cleared safely. Furthermore, a private law 
analysis also shows how complexity, legal risk, and cost can arise as by-products of 
contractual relations between members, non-members and the CCP, of the 
increased use of standardised products, and of the all-important (as Lehman 
Brothers showed) asset-backing requirements.  
 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
As I have argued, CCP clearing may usefully be understood as a private sector 
legal device, though this aspect of CCP clearing has not been addressed in a 
coherent way in the debates about the CCP prescription so far. It follows that 
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taking stock of how CCP clearing works offers a means with which to reconsider 
the complex debate surrounding the CCP prescription, including that following on 
from framework legislation such as the Dodd-Frank Act. More specifically, this 
approach assists by isolating two different types of challenges presented by the 
process of debating and implementing this reform.  
In the first place, the analysis above has highlighted certain drawbacks 
associated with CCP clearing, such as the build-up of risk within the CCP itself. 
Because these risks, limits, and other potential problems originate in the legal 
workings of the device, they are an inherent and unavoidable part of CCP clearing. 
Thus, policymakers intent on incorporating CCP clearing into the regulatory 
response to the financial crisis need to recognise and confront this category of 
problems as part of the process of designing new legislation.  
However, these drawbacks need to be distinguished from a second and 
distinct type of challenge which relates to the technical implementation of the 
reform rather than to the inherent legal capacity of the underlying device. There 
are several difficult and pressing challenges of this nature facing policymakers, a 
good example of which is the global coordination of reform. As has been 
recognised by many of the parties involved, it is going to be essential to coordinate 
new rules mandating CCP clearing across different jurisdictions (for example, as to 
the defined terms framing the clearing requirement in each case), as the OTC 
derivatives markets are sophisticated, cross-border, and adept at seeking 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.  
The thesis of this paper is that the challenges relating to regulatory arbitrage 
and conflicts of law are complex and pressing but of a different quality than those 
arising from the capacity of CCP clearing per se. Similarly, decisions about where 
CCPs should be located,130 or the regulatory methods that are most appropriate 
for the potentially diverse class of non-clearable contracts turn on issues which are 
different from those flowing from the mechanics of CCP clearing itself. This 
distinction between challenges relating to technical implementation and those 
relating to legal capacity is significant, principally because the former are 
challenges which, in an ideal world, could be pre-empted by regulatory 
coordination and the careful drafting of new rules, whereas the latter are not. 
As this analysis makes clear, both these sets of challenges need to be 
addressed in the process of implementing the CCP prescription. Both have come 
up in the global debates in one form or another, but there are advantages in 
differentiating between them. Not least, this approach allows the debate to be 
ordered in a more systematic way, which is preferable to policymakers attempting 
to address qualitatively different issues all together and across multiple forums 
simultaneously.  
                                                     
130 Currently, there are divergent views about whether it will be necessary as part of the CCP prescription 
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How this framework may apply in practice varies depending on the stage of 
the debates, and it also has potential as a means with which to critique eventual 
draft, primary or secondary, legislation on this issue. One suggestion is that the 
framework could be used to organise the process of producing draft legislation as 
follows: as the challenges relating to technical implementation need to be pre-
empted and most obviously require international cooperation, these should be 
regarded as ‘first order’ issues for national and international authorities (including 
IOSCO and CPSS) to address in a coordinated way and as a priority. Given that 
the CCP prescription will only be effective if these issues are addressed, authorities 
should regard these matters as pre-conditions for a separate round of discussion 
addressing the inherent challenges relating to the legal capacity of CCP clearing, 
which could be held in closer consultation with the CCP industry and users of 
clearing services themselves. Thus, the different qualities of the challenges relating 
to legal and technical implementation issues would be recognised, and 
policymakers would be afforded the opportunity to address each effectively rather 
than in an ad hoc way.   
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This is a significant moment in the history of financial regulation. As MacNeil and 
O’Brien put it, the public sector’s rescue of the banking system has meant that the 
‘power and influence of government within the regulatory matrix has been 
augmented considerably’.131 As shown in this paper, the OTC derivatives sector 
has become a target for duly empowered national and international authorities, 
and the CCP prescription for the OTC derivatives market has accumulated a good 
deal of momentum behind it. However, implementing these proposals has sparked 
a complex and transnational debate which has not yet yielded finalised legislation 
(outside the US) or precise rules about how the mechanism will work in practice 
(even in the US). The argument that I have made in this paper is that within these 
debates greater recognition should be paid to the fact that CCP clearing is first and 
foremost a private sector legal device, constructed from private law techniques to 
serve the market.  
From this starting point, I have argued that the debate about implementing 
the CCP prescription by means of new legislation would be advanced if the private 
law techniques underpinning it were acknowledged clearly and in detail. Amongst 
other benefits, this helps to isolate limitations built into CCP clearing from those 
challenges relating to the technical implementation of the reform. Systematising 
the questions of detail thrown up by this reform would, I have argued, be a 
constructive step towards effective primary and secondary legislation.  
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It is in many ways disappointing that a proposal like the CCP prescription 
should start off with so much high-profile support but nonetheless become so 
bogged down in technical detail. Importing a regulatory solution from the private 
sector has likely proved more controversial than advocates expected – there are 
still vitally important questions about the reform which are unresolved, after two 
years of discussions. But a private law analysis at least helps to make sense of it all 
by showing where the complexity comes from the legal mechanics of CCP clearing 
and where it does not.  
 
